Equal Protection and the Pregnancy Leave Case by Gardner, John D.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE PREGNANCY LEAVE CASE
Cases challenging employment practices relating to mandatory preg-
nancy leave for public employees' have reached courts of appeal in five
circuits; 2 all five circuits have applied a rational relation test to the regula-
tion attacked; three circuits found such regulations valid under the tradi-
tional rational relation test,3 and two circuits, invalid4 under the new
"substantial rationality" test developed in recent Supreme Court equal pro-
tection cases.5 Two of these pregnancy leave cases will be heard before the
Supreme Court of the United States.6
The preliminary issue that arises in these cases is whether or not man-
datory pregnancy leave rules classify by sex and thereby constitute sex dis-
crimination. While some circuits state that such rules do not classify by
sex, others take the position that any rule that applies to only one sex
discriminates against that sex. Most judicial attention has been spent upon
the threshold matters of whether or not a classification has been created;
the courts tend to gloss over the more complex problem of which equal
protection standard ought to apply, if a classification by sex is found.
Plaintiffs in these cases generally present arguments that women should
be given suspect classification treatment and that pregnancy leave rules
I The cases analyzed deal with pregnancy leave rules as applied to public employees. The
pregnancy leave policies of private business are covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). Pursuant to this act the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has adopted a rule prohibiting pregnancy leave disability rules, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.10(b), 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (Apr. 5, 1972). The statutory standard set forth in these
regulations is strict and provides more protection than a compelling state interest standard
of review. Thus the constitutional issues only arise through challenges of public employees
who are not covered by Title VII, and for this reason, the cases which have been decided
on the statutory ground are beyond the scope of this note. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act has since been amended to cover public schools and state agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a),
P.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). This congressional section moots the pregnancy leave
case arising after the Amendment.
2 Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Chesterfield
County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cit. 1973) rev'g on rehearing en banc, 467 F.2d
262 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1973); La Fleur v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565
(U.S. Apr. 23, 1973); Schattman v. Texas State Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th
Cir. 1972); Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972).
3 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973); Schattman
v. Texas State Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cit. 1972); Struck v. Secretary of
Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cit. 1972).
4 Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 673 F.2d 629 (2d Cit. 1973); La Fleur v. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cit. 1972).
5 See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-48. See also James v. Strange, 407
U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v.
Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
6Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cit. 1973), cert. granted,
41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1973); La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184
(6th Cit. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1973).
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interfere with two fundamental rights: the right to procreate and the right
to work. Alternatively they argue that sex classifications should be re-
quired to meet a higher standard of rationality than that embodied in the
minimal rational relation test applied to economic classifications. The
courts, however, have given these arguments little analytical attention. Af-
ter setting forth the factual background of a typical pregnancy leave case,
this note will deal with the technical question of whether such rules do
classify by sex. It will then analyze the applicability of the various equal
protection standards to sex classifications. Finally, this note will suggest
that a pregnancy leave rule produces no equality injury and that the bur-
dens imposed by such rules should be examined under due process stan-
dards rather than through equal protection.
The recent Sixth Circuit case of La Fleur v. The Cleveland Board of
Education7 provides a typical example of a pregnancy leave rule in opera-
tion. The Cleveland Board of Education required all pregnant teachers
to take an unpaid leave of absence, from five months prior to delivery
until at least three months after delivery. Once the teacher went on leave,
she was replaced permanently by another. Upon return, she was
reassigned and had no right to regain her former teaching position. Had
pregnancy been treated like sick leave, pregnant teachers would have been
able to use accrued sick leave days during their absences and would have
been able to return to their prior teaching assignments. Each teacher
would have been able to take leave as medical conditions and personal
efficiency dictate; some would have been able to work right up until the
time of delivery. Thus, if pregnancy were treated like sick leave, the preg-
nant teacher would be able to earn her usual salary for each working
month beyond the cut-off date, and the financial cost to the Board would
not change due to the necessity of hiring a replacement during the leave
period. Since the pregnant teacher did not lose seniority for promotion
purposes, other teachers received no competitive advantage from the preg-
nancy leave rule.8
Evidentiary hearings at trial centered largely around proof that preg-
nancy was a medical condition and ought to be treated as such. The
expert witness for the Board conceded that he often advised his patients
to work straight through until two weeks before delivery and admitted
that each pregnancy should be treated, if possible, as an individual case.
Evidence was adduced to the effect that efficiency and teaching ability di-
minished slightly during pregnancy, but there was no evidence that the
mother's health or any other interest was in any way affected by, or related
to, the three-month mandatory post natal leave. Although conceding that
each pregnancy was medically unique and some pregnant teachers could
7465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
81d. at 1186.
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work until delivery, the Board justified the regulation principally in terms
of administrative efficiency since the date for replacing the teacher was
readily ascertainable. The Board also argued that the danger of assaults
by students and the interruption of class by snide remarks justified the
regulation. Though the La Fleur Court agreed that administrative burdens
were lightened to a slight extent it insisted that the threat of assault and
the prevention of snide remarks were not sufficient to counter the interests
of the teacher in her employment. The court struck down the rule as
failing to satisfy an increased rationality requirement under the equal pro-
tection clause.
I. Do MANDATORY PREGNANCY LEAVE RULES
DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF SEX?
The first issue in the pregnancy leave case is whether these rules clas-
sify by sex. Alternative answers to the question exist. Since the rule
applies only to women it can be viewed as a discrimination based upon
sex. On the other hand, the rule can be viewed as dealing exclusively
with a condition, and the fact that the condition strikes one sex alone
can be considered fortuitous and irrelevant. Those circuits which view
these regulations primarily as impositions upon women tend to strike them
down on a substantial rationality requirement while those that consider
them neutral regulations of pregnancy uphold them under a minimal ra-
tionality standard.
Quite obviously, the pregnancy leave rule applies to only one sex, but
the issue the circuits should confront is whether a classification which bur-
dens pregnancy burdens an entire sex. Typically the opinions state their
conclusions without setting forth any detailed reason for taking one view
as opposed to the other. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in La Fleur,
referred to the explicit sex classification in Reed v. Reed9 and reasoned
that, "Here too, we deal with a classification which is inherently based
on sex."' 0  Similarly the Second Circuit, in Green v. Waterford Board of
Education," agreed that a pregnancy leave rule applies only to women and
constitutes a discrimination based upon sex.
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit, in Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board,'2 held that there was no reason to view a pregnancy leave
rule as a sex classification since all of those similarly situated with respect
to pregnancy are treated equally irrespective of sex. The Fifth Circuit,
in Schattman v. Texas State Employment Commission,'3 rejected the notion
9404 U.S. 71 (1971).
10 465 F.2d at 1188.
11473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
12 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
13 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
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that regulations dealing with pregnancy are inherently or self-evidently
based upon sex and agreed that "the fact that only a woman becomes
pregnant does not nullify the pregnancy in the ensuing physical condi-
tions."' 4  The court refused to look beyond the face of the regulation
and felt that it classified by pregnancy, rather than by sex.
Pregnancy leave rules establish two classes of persons: pregnant teach-
ers and all other teachers. In order to find a sex classification one must
go beyond the face of the regulation and somehow infer that a classifica-
tion of pregnant teachers in fact applies to all women teachers, that is,
that the regulation discriminated against the entire sex. This inference
is, at best, metaphysical. Some female teachers choose not to have children
while employed, others begin employment only after having had children,
and still others are beyond child-bearing age and could not enter the regu-
lated class even if they so wished. Thus substantial groups of female
teachers are never affected by the rule.' 5 Cases which argue that preg-
nancy leave rules are sex discriminations advance no reasons why "discrim-
ination" only against female teachers of child-bearing age who have chil-
dren or who might wish to have children while employed must be imputed
to the larger class of all female teachers. One could argue that all female
teachers ought to be free to have children while employed, but the dis-
crimination still does not apply to all female teachers.
Pregnancy is not an inevitable incident of womanhood. Women can
avoid pregnancy and thus can avoid falling within the regulated class.
Not only, then, is the inference of sex classification unexplained, but it
imputes discrimination against a smaller class, whose members entered vol-
untarily, to a larger class of persons bearing fixed biological traits. The
objection to viewing a pregnancy leave rule as a sex classification arises
primarily from the lack of any guiding principle which can control the
impulse to view narrow classications as offending the interests of some
larger group. There are many statutes and regulations to prevent hemo-
philiacs and colorblind persons from driving or holding certain jobs, and
yet the judiciary does not customarily view such burdens as offending males
generally. The fact that these sex linked traits exhibit their symptoms
exclusively in males would be viewed as fortuitous and incidental to regula-
tions which speak narrowly to the underlying conditions. A similar cul-
tural habit of mind tends to prevent judges from viewing criminal rape
statutes as offending males generally nor prosecutions of prostitution to
females generally. If regulations dealing with pregnancy classify by sex,
then an argument could be made that school boards offering pregnancy
14 Id. at 40.
15 Statistics indicate that 22% of the female teachers in the Cleveland system are above
child bearing age. Exact percentages for other unaffected dassed cannot be determined from
the statistics. Brief for Petitioners at 6, La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th
Cir. 1972).
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
leave with pay would discriminate against males, who could not possibly
qualify for the benefits.16 Moreover, cases finding a sex classification in
a pregnancy leave rule do not provide any neutral principle or test which
would avoid unnecessary disruption of state power to regulate conditions
that may threaten state interests.
Those circuits which found such classifications have determined that
the social and political importance of removing any obstacles which tend
to impede the entry of women into the labor market overbalances the
significance of administrative convenience and employee efficiency asserted
by the employer. But the sex classification view leads to a misstatement
of the issue. Actually the interests involved are much narrower. The
precise question is whether females must be allowed to have babies upon
their own terms while employed. The larger interests of women in equal
economic opportunity and in equal pay for equal work are not offended
by the pregnancy leave rule, and yet a finding of sex classification tends
to prejudice the balancing of interests actually involved in the pregnancy
leave case.
On a more technical basis the state legislature or school board could
have adopted either of two possible classifications both of which would
serve their interests in efficient employees and continuity of instruction.
It could refuse to hire any women, or it could take the narrower course
and adopt a pregnancy leave rule applicable to pregnant persons. The
approach chosen implies a prior legislative rejection of the broader sex
classification which the courts have found in the narrower pregnancy leave
rule. Apparently there is no way that the legislature may classify with
respect to pregnancy without running afoul of the sex discrimination
charge. The legitimacy of judicial intervention on behalf of women's em-
ployment interests weakens when the classification used in the regulation
indicates that the legislature has already balanced the interests of women
employees against the efficiency and continuity interests threatened by preg-
nancy. Judicial broadening of the classification beyond the terms of the
regulation has the characteristics of a manipulative device used to readjust
a prior legislative balancing of interests.
On a more intuitive level it might be tempting to view mandatory
leave policies as a product of a consistent pattern of sexual stereotypes
which in the aggregate, tend to disadvantage all women. Perhaps the
Sixth and Second Circuits felt that mandatory pregnancy leave rules cannot
be approached as a discrete problem, but must be interpreted in a larger
context of what the courts believe to be prevailing social attitudes. How-
ever, these courts should then have found as a fact that leave rules arise
out of sex role sterotypes, and they ought to have given precise indications
16 Cf. Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972), where ten minutes rest
breaks for women in addition to those given men were held violative of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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of the relationship between these suspicions and the finding of sex classi-
fication in otherwise neutral regulations.
In fact, the sex classification issue has been employed to the exclusion
of much more complex constitutional issues. The circuits tend to decide
these cases on the basis of whether such rules classify by sex, when the real
issue involves the question of whether effects of pregnancy threaten interests
of the public employer to an extent which justifies the burdens imposed
by the pregnancy leave rule. Resolution of the pregnancy leave case in
terms of sex classification raises more questions than it answers. The cir-
cuits have not set forth any analysis of the various equal protection stan-
dards of review which may be applied to pregnancy, nor have they care-
fully considered the competing interests to be balanced in the pregnancy
leave situations.
Furthermore, the finding of a sex classification in no way disposes of
equality claims of pregnant persons. Under the evolving "newer equal
protection ' 17 the old rational basis test has been strengthened to require
a higher degree of rationality between classification and purpose served.
The emphasis given to the sex classification issue by the two circuits which
struck down pregnancy leave rules indicates a misapprehension that an
application of the "newer equal protection" depends upon the nature of
the classification rather than any specific quantum of "rationality," and
that some intuitive suspicion of unfairness is necessary to trigger the new
standard. On the other hand, those circuits which have upheld these preg-
nancy leave rules deal with an entirely different issue when they emphasize
the lack of a sex classification. If these latter circuits were merely pre-
occupied with the sex classification, they would still have to face the more
precise question of whether these rules deprive pregnant persons of the "new-
er equal protection." By foreclosing the equal protection claim of preg-
nant persons through a finding that no sex classification exists, they must
be holding that pregnant persons have no equality injury, or no equality
interest to assert that will sustain an equal protection claim.
A finding of sex classification does, however, constitute a prerequisite
to successful attack under the suspect classifications doctrine. Plaintiffs
argue that sex classifications are suspect, and thus the sex classification
issue does have direct relevance to the first argument raised in the preg-
nancy leave case.
II. THE SUSPECT CLASSIFICTIONS ARGUMENT
Once a court determines that a pregnancy leave rule classifies by sex,
it must decide whether sex classifications ought to be treated as suspect
under the equal protection clause. If all sex classifications are suspect,
the pregnancy leave rule would have to be justified by a compelling state
17 See Gunther, supra note 5.
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interest. Although this argument has been met by silence in all of the
pregnancy leave cases, the literature abounds with arguments in favor of
extending "suspect classification" treatment to women, 8 and at least one
federal district court' 9 as well as a state supreme court20 have applied the
doctrine to women outside the pregnancy leave context.
For purposes of review under the equal protection clause, the Supreme
Court has developed the doctrine of suspect classifications applicable to
race,2' alienage,22 and national origin.23 When the Court applies this stan-
dard, the burden of proof shifts to the state to show not only that the
regulation in question serves a compelling state interest but ktlso that the
regulation imposes the slightest burden possible consistent with achieving
the statutory purpose on the class created. As a first step in the analysis,
suspect classifications are presumed to lack rational relation to any per-
missible state purpose. Hence, classifications by certain external or con-
genital physical traits which are seldom relevant to the state interests of
health, safety, and welfare may often be suspect.24 If, as a hitorical mat-
ter, the community associates certain individual characteristics with the
physical traits common to the group, the Court suspects that a classification
is based only upon group identity and is not rationally related to the ef-
fectuation of a legitimate state purpose, which generally requires catego-
rization by individual qualities.25  Since classification by sex involves ex-
ternal physical traits from which the community infers certain ndividual
qualities in members of the group, it follows that such classifications will
produce suspicion of irrationality. However, suspicions of irrationality
can be handled by means of the rational relation test, and as a general
rule something more than cultural propensity to stereotype members of a
group must be established before the group may qualify as a suspect class.
Were it otherwise, practically every conceivable grouping based upon ex-
ternal physical traits would be suspect, including the mentally and phy-
sically handicapped and deprived.26
18 For a general overview of the literature containing such arguments see, Comment, Are
Sex Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect, 66 Nw. L REV., 481 (1971); 52 B.U.
L. REv. 196 (1972); 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 857 (1971); 72 Wisc. L. REV. 629 (1972); 25
VAND. L. REV. 412 (1972); Comment, Loves Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity
Leaves, 7 HARv. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 260 (1972); Note, Developments in the Law,
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Karst, Invidious Discriminations, 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 716 (1969); Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
1 United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
20 Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
21 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
2 2 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
23 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
24 Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1770 (1973).
2 5 This conclusion would follow from the assertions in the Frontiero plurality that external
characteristics are irrelevant to underlying individual qualities.
2 6 Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 24.
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The second step of analysis requires historical or empirical evidence
demonstrating the tendency of legislatures to (1) stereotype the particular
group in the legislative process, and (2) malevolently impose unequal bur-
dens.27  Absent evidence of legislative stereotyping and malevolence, the
judiciary would be intervening on behalf of a class which is stereotyped
through the random cultural choices of a free people rather than on behalf
of one which is invidiously discounted through state action. The equal
protection clause may legitimately be interpreted to restrict the freedom
of legislature to reflect the discriminatory cultural choices of the people
while distributing society's burdens, but there is no textual warrant for
establishing strict standards of review until popular discriminatory attitudes
clearly appear in the terms of statutes which allocate these burdens. An
accidental or irrational burdening alone will not suffice, since the primary
objective of the suspect classification doctrine is the defeat of state regula-
tions which have the dominant purpose and effect of suppressing minori-
ties, but which, at the same time, can be justified as being rationally related
to some other subsidiary state interest. In this situation the judiciary has
reason to suspect that legislators enacted burdensome laws with malevolent
intent to suppress minorities and then justified such laws in terms of some
marginal benefit to the state. The utility of the doctrine lies in its ability
to overcome merely colorable justifications and thus invalidate a burden-
some law while avoiding the difficult task of proving malevolent intent.
The question, therefore, immediately arises whether the alleged bur-
dens imposed by sex classifications were the product of malevolent intent.
Within the context of history, it becomes necessary to decide whether sex
classifications have placed burdens upon women, and if so, whether ma-
levolent intent was a significant factor. A brief analysis of race classifica-
tions will serve as a starting point. The legislative history of the Four-
teenth Amendment bolsters the notion that the equal protection clause
was intended to have particular protective effect upon ex-slaves. 8 In this
context, there was ample evidence that slaves would be deprived of. legal
rights by legislatures. Specific statutes which created such classifications
and imposed burdens upon ex-slaves reinforced the notion that legislative
bodies were prone to enact laws with an overt or covert purpose of de-
priving that particular class of its rights.2"
27 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1287, 1311 (1973), states
that the traditional indicia of suspectness are: a class saddled with disabilities or subjected to
such a history of unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
"as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." The plural-
ity opinion in Frontiero also implies a requirement that unequal burdens be reflected in the
statutes before a suspect classification may be established. 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1769.
28 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
29 Plessey v. Furguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) provides the classic example of such a statute.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U.S. 339 (1960) provides a more subtle example.
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In the context of sex classifications, however, there is no reliable his-
torical evidence that legislatures deal with women in malevolent and in-
sidious ways. Dower statutes, election statutes (taking against the will),
the marital deduction, community property, alimony, maternal preference
in custody contests, child support, and marital rights and duties are all
aimed at easing burdens for the majority of women. It is difficult to
argue that such statutes burden women or that they are the product of
exploitative intent. The argument that these seemingly beneficent laws
were part of a grand scheme to confine women to traditional roles has
little basis in fact.30 Even today women disagree as to their proper role,
and notions of malevolence are hard to justify even on intuitive bases.
On the other hand, women's protective legislation, such as maximum
work hour laws, exemption from jury service, maximum weight lifting
laws, and exemption from military conscription, fall into a slightly differ-
ent category since they arguably could have the effect of restricting the
economic opportunity of women. The appropriate question is whether
they were so designed. In the last century, many embryonic reform move-
ments arose in response to conditions produced by the industrial revolu-
tion.31 Women made very significant contributions to the reforms of that
period,3 2 and could chronicle with pride the passage of women's protective
legislation.3  The modern feeling, however, seems to be that the wom-
en's protective legislation growing out of this reform movement was tai-
lored to exact a quid pro quo from women in terms of reduced economic
opportunity. Irrespective of present day effects of these statutes,3 4 the mo-
30 See note 18 supra. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (1973). None of
these authorities confront the array of judicial authority for the proposition that female protective
legislation was designed to help women. On the bona fides of limiting contractual capacity of
married women see Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 382 (1878). On the bona fides of female
protective legislation see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1907); and West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 397 (1937):
What could be closer to the public interest than the health of women and their protec-
tion from unscrupulous and overreaching employers. . . .The legislature of the state
was dearly entitled to consider .. . the fact that [women] are in a class receiving
the least pay, that their bargaining power is relatively weak and that they are the ready
victims of those who would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances.
300 U.S. at 398.
3 1 See 2 S. MORISON, H. COMMANGER & T. LEUCHTENBERG, THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 81-103, 266-295 (6th ed. 1969).
a2 See S. BRECKENRIDGE, WOMEN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1933); and V. SAPIEPKA,
EMINENT WOMEN (1948). See generalty NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, 1607-1950; A BIO-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (E. T. James ed. 1971).
3 3 See CLARA BEVER, HISTORY OF LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN IN THREE STATES;
and FLORENCE SMITH, CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN
IN THE UNITED STATES. (Women's Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bulletin No. 66, 1929).
34 One may fairly doubt that these statutes hinder the economic freedom of the average
woman as the modern literature alleges. Rather, they offend the identity of the middle class
woman who was never intended as the beneficiary. Instructive for purposes of highlighting
the class differences involved is INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214, providing a deduction
for housekeeping and child care expenses and necessarily presupposing a ready supply of
cheap female labor to clean up after their more afluent "sisters."
[Vol. 34
NOTES
tives for their passage must be ascertained in a manner consistent with
the motives behind passage of similar types of reform legislation arising
out of the same period in response to the same conditions.8 5 These stat-
utes were part of a consistent reform movement, and to assume some sort
of conspiracy on the part of late nineteenth century reformers to suppress
women in the latter half of the twentieth requires the further assumption
of superhuman prescience.
In the absence of better evidence, no reason exists to suppose that
nineteenth century sex classifications were anything but a sensible adjust-
ment to nineteenth century conditions and needs. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine that women textile workers at the turn of the century would have
complained that maximum work hour laws for women interfered with
their right to work sixteen hours a day, as opposed to ten. In the past,
factory work demanded physical exertion to the point of debilitating the
health of workers. Presses and cutters lacked safety equipment, lighting
was poor, noise levels were high, and industrial accidents exacted extreme
costs in life and limb.36 Legislation protecting women from these hazards
is not the traditional stuff of a suspect class. Such legislation hardly pro-
vides the sort of well-stocked environs in which one hunts for invidious
discriminations.
The opinions which held that sex constitutes a suspect classification
for purposes of review under the equal protection clause did so on the
grounds that women have been treated with malevolence by society at
large and legislatures in particular. Sail'er Inn v. Kirby37 found explicitly
that categorizing sex classifications as suspect is necessary to protect women
from opportunity-restrictive laws, and United States ex rel. Robinson v.
York"' argued that a statute assigning women to a minimum security farm
for indeterminate periods with release conditioned upon rehabilitation evi-
denced the need to treat sex as a suspect classification. The York court
reasoned that the statute permitted detention of females for longer periods
than males for the same offenses and that this aspect demonstrated legisla-
tive malevolence. In actuality, the statute was premised upon the notion
that women are more amenable to rehabilitation than men and allowed
early release predicated upon evidence of rehabilitation. The opinion did
not deal with the legislative history of the statute but argued, nevertheless,
that its obvious purpose was to mete out longer prison terms to women.
Again, there was no statistical analysis of whether women did in fact serve
longer average terms than men under the statute, nor had the particular
35 See J. LEsCOHIER, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1896-1932; WORKING
CONDITIONS, (1935); and E. BRANDEIS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1896-
1932; LABOR LEGISLATION, (1935).
S6 See material cited at note 35 supra.
3 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
8 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
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plaintiff in the case served anywhere near the total maximum sentence
applicable to males.
Neither of these opinions mentioned the possible argument that inclu-
sion of sex discrimination within the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
subsequent ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment provide evidence
that Congress presently feels that women deserve suspect classifications
treatment under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although this position arguably has appeal, it fails to justify judicial inter-
vention in the area of women's rights. Modern equal rights legislation
conclusively demonstrates that the Congress and the states have the ability
and the will to deal equitably with women. Just as legislatures in the
past were solicitous of feminine welfare when they enacted women's pro-
tective legislation so modern legislatures demonstrate the same tendency
when they approve remedial legislation providing women with equal eco-
nomic opportunity. If the courts were to extend suspect classification treat-
ment to women, they would be competing with the legislative branch,
which has already demonstrated willingness to remedy inequality. Rather
than nullifying legislative acts which burden the female sex, the courts
would be establishing standards of solicitude in competition with those
established by the legislative branch. They would review legislation on
the basis of whether it was sufficiently solicitous of feminine welfare, rather
than on the basis of legislative oppression. The extension of judicial pro-
tection to a class comprising 51o of the population presents further dif-
ficulties. If an absolute majority of the population feels oppressed, then
it can protect itself through the electoral process. The fact that women
have not united to exert power at the ballot box would seem to indicate
substantial disagreement within the class, and would also indicate conflict-
ing demands upon the legislative process from within that class. Perhaps
the curious mix of domestic relations law, protective legislation, and equal
rights legislation accurately reflects the inconsistent demands of women.
Any judicial attempt to rationalize the conflicts might interfere with the
proper legislative adjustment of competing interests.
At this juncture, it is important to note that in the application of
the suspect classification doctrine to race, the requirement of malevolent
intent has become progressively less significant. A line of lower court
authority has misapplied Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion3 ' by finding violations of equal protection in de facto situations which
essentially lack malevolence or suspect purpose.40  These lower court
291402 U.S. 1 (1971).
40 See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 459 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1972),
total abandonment of the de jure - de facto distinction where Mexican Americans attended
predominantly Mexican American schools as a matter or cultural choice rather than state
action; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), preferential hiring of minorities
with lesser qualifications than whites ordered by the court on the basis of statistical imbalance
alone; Larry P. v. Riels, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D_ Cal. 1972), unconstitutionality of IQ
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"quota cases" focus on racial imbalance alone and abandon altogether the
requirement of malevolent intent, thus the original libertarian premise un-
derlying the doctrine has been replaced by a national interest in the organic
unity of the population.4' Quite unabashedly, the lower courts have ar-
rived at the legislative judgment that all races will be equal, and that
any demonstrable racial imbalance will be rectified without respect to
whether it arose as a result of impermissible legislative acts or as a by-
product of cultural choices uncontrolled by the state.42 Some lower courts
will presume that all racial imbalance is legislatively malevolent since the
state has power to rectify that imbalance.43 In a sense, the lower courts
have injected the theories of Rousseau 44 and Hegel45 into the equal protec-
tion clause in much the same manner as the Court in Lochner v. New
York46 identified substantive due process with the theories of Adam
Smith.47 But even if suspect classifications now reflect a national interest
in organic unity of the population, the demand for a raceless and classless
society rests upon entirely different legislative interests than the demand
for a sexless society. To this extent, any case which would extend suspect
classification treatment to women on the basis of statistical imbalance
would fail to take account of the substantial difference between the legis-
lative interests involved. Culturally determined sex roles do not present
the same threat of civil discord as do imposed race and class roles. Thus
we must infer that women do not merit suspect classification treatment
tests where they lead to racial imbalance; Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio
1972), expenditure of HUD funds on low income housing in black neighborhoods held unconsti-
tutional; Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), busing between Detroit
and the surrounding county schools.
41 Originally, the doctrine assumed that racial classifications had nothing to do with the
underlying qualities of the individual. The plurality opinion in Frontiero, supra note 24
adheres to this view. The "state action" concept further demanded that the courts leave
individuals alone to associate and discriminate as they please. Hence, individual liberty was
a predominant theme of the fourteenth amendment.
42 The end result of the demise of "state action" allows courts to force individuals into
associations they would rather avoid. The sacrifice of individual liberty, speech, assembly,
and association can be justified by the national interest in homogeniety. See Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 15, 34 (1959). But see
Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429 (1960).
43The failure to perform "affirmative obligations" provides all the suspectness that is
necessary.
4 4 JEAN JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (W. Ebenstein ed., Great Political
Thinkers, 3d ed. 1960), provides the cornerstone for all modern egalitarian statist concepts.
Within Rousseau's framework, the courts now constitute themselves the interpreters of the
general will and echo the ideal: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common
under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive
each member as an indivisible part of the whole." Id. at 445.
45 Hegel espoused the notion that an individual can have no true identity apart from
that derived from the collective achievements in support of the state. Id. at 600.
46 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4 7 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, advanced the theory of laissez faire economics.
As the title suggests, Smith was mainly concerned with maximizing national power and was
not overly impressed with the value of individual liberty for its own sake.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
even within the latest line of cases interpreting the equal protection clause
as a constitutional mandate for societal gemeinschaft.48
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARGUMENT
A second argument for a strict standard of review arises within the
context of mandatory pregnancy leave. Every citizen has fundamental
rights that, as a matter of equal protection, may be interfered with only
to serve a compelling state interest. Such rights include, in addition to
specific enumerations in the Bill of Rights and penumbral rights thereto:
voting,49 procreation, 50 marriage, 51 interstate travel,52 and marital privacy.r
Note that in La Fleur the appellant argued that the regulation subjected
her to unequal treatment by making continued employment contingent
upon the non-exercise of her constitutional right to procreate. She also
asked the court to establish a new fundamental right to work,54 and argued
that no regulation may unequally burden this requested right in the ab-
sence of a compelling state interest. The La Fleur court felt that the plain-
tiff's interest in the employment relation was of sufficient importance that a
regulation may not interfere in an arbitrary and capricious way, but the
court did not apply an "interference with a fundamental right" analysis.
Also, in Struck v. Secretary of the Defense,5  the Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that dismissal of a pregnant Air Force officer infringed upon
her marital privacy, but no reasons for the rejection were given.56
The reluctance of the circuits to seize upon these doctrines in the preg-
nancy leave cases seems to cast doubt upon their ultimate reach, but these
doctrines do apply with singular theoretical consistency. If the right to
enjoy marital privacy and the right to procreate are in fact fundamental
rights, school boards and other public employers would have a heavy bur-
den in justifying a leave policy which burdens them. However, the lower
courts' reluctance to discuss this theory may be due to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Dandridge v. Williams,57 which upheld a Maryland welfare
scheme although it burdened the exercise of the right to procreate. In
Dandridge the Court upheld an admitted state interest in encouraging fain-
48 This German word for "community" has strong Hegelian overtones. Apprehension
that the judiciary might grant suspect classification status on this ground is not entirely unfounded.
The plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1770 and n.17 (1973), places
great emphasis upon statistical imbalance.
49 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
50 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
51 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
52 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
53 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
54 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
55460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972).
561d. at 1376.
57 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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ily planning s and noted that the state could allocate its limited resources
in any rational manner and that no one had a fundamental right to public
funds. At bottom, then, the pregnancy leave contest is over the public
employee's "right" to work and a thousand dollars or so of compensation,
as against the right of the governmental unit to promote the efficiency
of its employees and the continuity of its functions. One has difficulty
seeing why a public employee's interest in an extra thousand is more funda-
mental than the interest of the Dandridge welfare recipient in his thous-
and, or for that matter, more fundamental than the financial interests of
the employer in Lochner. 9 Failure of the courts to grapple with these
issues testifies to the limited reach of the "interference with a fundamental
right" argument.
Moreover, recent developments since the pregnancy leave decisions
have considerably weakened the fundamental right argument. In San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,0 the Court held that edu-
cation is not a constitutional right and that an unequal burdening of this
right does not give rise to a compelling state interest standard of review.6
This decision casts considerable doubt upon the fundamental rights method
of attack in future cases. Recent decisions tend to apply the substantial
rationality test to those instances which involve fundamental interests un-
der the old "two-tiered model" of equal protection.62
IV. THE SUBSTANTIAL RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court had consistently dealt with sex classifications on
the basis of a rational relation test;63 however, Frontiero v. Richardson,
indicates that this test may soon be abandoned. 4 The traditional rational
relation test has undergone dramatic changes within the last few years
and has been replaced with respect to certain equality interests by a sub-
stantial rationality requirement, sometimes referred to as the "newer equal
protection" or the "Burger Court equal protection. ' 65
Under the traditional formulation of the rational relation test, the Su-
preme Court has upheld female protective legislation, including exclusions
from certain occupations.66 The classic decision in Goesaert v. Cleary"
58d. at 473.
50 The employer disliked the idea of paying higher wages. In the pregnancy leave case,
the public employee misses her normal income. The former fell under the rubric of due
process, while the latter falls under equal protection.
6093 S.Ct. 1287 (1973).
61 The right to education was established by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 2 See Gunther, supra note 5, at 12-15, 17-18.
63 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 462 (1948); and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
6493 S. Ct. 1764 (1973).
6 5 See Gunther, supra note 5, at 1.
6 6 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 462 (1948); and
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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upheld a statute which generally excluded women from jobs as bartenders,
although it allowed them to be waitresses and bar maids and allowed wives
and daughters of male tavern owners to tend bar. The statute was al-
legedly designed to protect female morality but the more likely purpose
was protection of the male bartender's union from more comely competi-
tion, a clearly impermissible purpose from an equal protection standpoint.
The Court declined to recognize this invidious motive and assessed the
rationality of the statute only in terms of the alleged purpose. The Court
refused to assess the limited effects such a law would have upon female
morality, and in addition, reasoned that it could pass muster'irrespective
of its underinclusive nature. Apparently, it was sufficient that the law
protects the morals of only a few women while leaving the morals of
others similarly situated to the depredations of the bar room.
This pattern of deference to legislative sex classifications no longer
applies. In Reed v. Reed,68 an Idaho probate code provision preferring
males to females among applicants for letters of administration in the same
entitlement class was found unconstitutional for failure of the preference
to relate in a rational manner to any state interest. The Idaho supreme
court had previously upheld the statute, finding it rationally related to
the state interest in avoiding hearings on the merits to determine which
applicant was more qualified. The Supreme Court held that the state in-
terest was insufficient to justify the legislative grant of preference to the
male sex. The Court further held that the objective of reducing the pro-
bate caseload must be advanced in a manner consistent with the command
of the equal protection clause. "To give mandatory preference to members
of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimina-
tion of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legisla-
tive choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 69
Despite the fact that Reed is couched in the phraseology of minimal
rationality, a different analytical standard was used there. The statute read
as follows: "Of several persons claiming and equally entitled [under §
15-3123 to administer, males must be preferred to females, and relatives
of the whole to those of the half blood. ' 70 In holding this stated prefer-
ence irrational, the Reed Court reasoned that the preference did not relate
to the purpose of assuring that administrators were as closely related to
the decedent as possible. The terms of the preference itself suggest that
its purpose might be to provide the most competent administrator, assum-
ing that men, on the average, have more business experience than women,
67 335 U.S. 462 (1948).
68404 U.S. 71 (1972).
69 Id. at 76.
701d. at 73. IOWA CODE § 15-314 (1947).
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but the Court refused to analyze its rationality as a means of attaining
this objective. Actually, the Idaho scheme served a mix of several pur-
poses. The primary purpose was to select administrators of the closest
degree of kinship to the decedent as possible. When this primary purpose
of kinship was satisfied by the presence of two equally related contestants,
the terms of the sex preference served the purpose of selecting the more
qualified administrator. The mandatory nature of the preference suggests
a third purpose, that of reducing costs. The complete statement of the
statutory purpose would be: To select administrators from the closest de-
gree of kinship, but among competitors of equal kinship, to select the
most qualified while incurring the least cost to the state in the selection
process. 71
The statute attacked in Reed was rather obviously rational in relation
to this comprehensive mix of purposes. It is hard to conceive of a statute
which would serve this mix with greater rationality and indeed it seems
that the Reed holding can be attributed only to a balancing of the interest
in female opportunity against the cost of providing such opportunity.
Within the limited context of Reed, this opportunity cost is probably mini-
mal because only the divorced parents of a deceased child would be com-
peting for letters of administration.
The rationality standard applied in Reed has the disadvantage of cloud-
ing any helpful analysis of the values to be balanced. First, the state
interest in saving money should not be branded as "mere avoidance of
hearings" or "mere administrative convenience" and then dismissed as in-
consequential. The legislative branch has the task of raising revenue and
allocating funds to achieve state purposes. If the judiciary is going to
intervene in this process, it ought to estimate the exact dollar costs to
be assessed on behalf of the particular interests of the class it seeks to
protect. Second, it is unclear from a rationality analysis whether the judi-
cially protected interest of female opportunity must be achieved at all costs
or whether this interest will only be protected at a reasonable cost when
a reasonable percentage of females will accrue practical benefits. It would
be interesting to find out how many women could win on the merits in
the Idaho contests for letters of administration, and whether this percentage
could reasonably justify the costs.
The latest Supreme Court case on sex classifications seems to abandon
rationality as a test for judicial intervention, but establishes no standard
of review to take its place. In Frontiero v. Richardson72 eight justices
struck down a provision under a federal statute disallowing dependents'
allowances to women members of the armed forces who could not prove
the economic dependence of the male spouse. Male members of the armed
71 This method of analysis has been borrowed from Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality,
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
7293 S.Ct. 1764 (1973).
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forces were given such allowances without regard to the actual economic
dependence of the female spouse. Four of the justices felt that sex should
be treated as a suspect classification under the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause. One justice concurred because the statute constituted "an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. ' 73 Three justices
concurred in the judgment on the authority of Reed, and one justice dis-
sented.
The plurality opinion extended suspect classification treatment to wom-
en on the grounds that they had been stereotyped in past laws and because
Congress and a majority of the state legislatures have indicated that wom-
en's equality interests deserve a strict standard of judicial protection. De-
spite the rather obvious fact that women have been stereotyped in past
laws, the historical evidence indicates that laws which embody the female
stereotype have been designed, in the majority of cases, to protect women
and ease their burdens. Furthermore, there is no evidence that a majority
of women have disapproved of legislative sex classifications. Thus there
should be no judicial suspicion of unfair or unjust legislative balancing
where such classifications are used. Due to the apparent majoritarian ap-
proval by the class allegedly discriminated against, an analogy of sex classi-
fications to race classifications is completely inapposite. Finally, the refer-
ence to Congress and the state legislatures is ludicrous; if these legislative
bodies seek to protect the interests of women, they can do it themselves
rather than passing off responsibility to an appointed judiciary. The notion
that judges should establish competing standards of solicitude for a class
which the legislature already seeks to protect is indeed a novel interpreta-
tion of judicial review.74
The inability of a majority of the justices to agree on any single equal
protection standard demonstrates dissatisfaction with the "two tiered" sys-
tem established by the Warren Court.75  The lack of agreement also indi-
cates dissatisfaction with suspect classifications and rationality as the tools
of equal protection analysis. The Court might possibly be heading toward
a single standard of invidiousness which will trigger equal protection scru-
tiny along a sliding scale of values depending upon the relative need for
protection of the classification which is injured.76
73M. at 1773.
74 The initial purpose of judicial review was to refuse enforcement to legislative acts which
were inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution. This power was never intended to confer
upon the judiciary the legislative and executive power to replace legislatively chosen means of
achieving a constitutional end with more effective judicial remedies for achieving the same
end.
75The Warren Court established strict scrutiny under "suspect classifications" and "funda-
mental interests" while it reviewed most legislative acts under the minimal scrutiny standard
of the rational basis test. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 8-12.
76 Support for the notion may be gathered from the concurrence of Justices Stewart and
Powell in Frontiero. Also, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 715 (1972) struck
down a statute which discriminates against illegitimates without mentioning the suspect classi-
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The result in Frontiero cannot readily be explained through any of
the analytical devices used in the "newer equal protection" cases such as
Reed. A preliminary statement of the legislative purposes served by the
challenged statute would be to make the armed forces more attractive to
married individuals with dependents but at the least cost to government.
The Frontiero Court focused upon the relevance of the sex classification
to the governmental interest in cost savings and found that forcing women
to prove actual dependence of the male spouse is underinclusive with re-
spect to the cost saving interest. Obviously, the way to cure this under-
inclusiveness and to eliminate the sex classification would be to require
that all married members of the armed forces prove actual dependence.
However, the underinclusiveness of the sex classification suggests a congres-
sional conclusion that attracting married males into the armed forces re-
quires greater inducements than attracting married females. Dependency
allowances without regard to actual dependence may have been necessary
to attract married males into the combat arms, while such allowances were
not necessary to attract married females into clerical and medical posi-
tions.77 The sex classification thus suggests a fuller statement of the gov-
ernmental purposes underlying the statute, those of attracting personnel
into the armed forces, but only to the extent that extra inducements are
necessary and at the least cost to the government.
The result in Frontiero cannot rest upon the lack of a rational relation
between the statutory classifications and the purposes served. It has been
suggested, however, that the newer equal protection demands that the stat-
utory classification serve a rational state purpose. Roe v. Wade 7  and Ei-
senstadt v. Baird7 9 may be read as imposing an equal protection restraint
upon governmental and state objectives.8 0 At the very least, these cases
suggest that state interests in the preservation of morality are insufficient
to overcome the societal interest in the welfare of the individuals affected
by the laws attacked. But providing inducements to enter the military
is an eminently rational goal, and the provision of additional incentives
to that class which risks combat duty also seems to be a thoroughly rational
purpose. The governmental interest in providing these benefits at least
cost is always rational. Although governments at various levels may have
fications doctrine. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); and Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
77 All males risk direct combat duty irrespective of primary miltiary occupational skill.
78410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
8
oWhenever statutes attempt to impose "traditional" moral notions, the classifications used
are likely to be found irrational. Roe v. Wade, supra note 72; Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra note
79; and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra note 76, are consistent with this view.
These cases are more concerned with proscribing the substance of the laws attacked than
with supervising the constitutionality of the means used.
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abundant resources, these resources are limited, and thus many socially
desirable equality interests must be sacrificed to fiscal necessity.
Frontiero indicates that the nature of the classification will determine
the extent of judicial scrutiny. This analysis derives force from Dandridge
v. Williams8' and San Antonio Consolidated School District v. Rodriguez82
which present conflicts between the equality interests of the poor and the
state's fiscal resources. The only difference between these latter cases and
Frontiero was the undefined and indiscrete nature of the classification de-
nominated within the label "poor." In the abstract, the discreteness of
the classification should not make any difference, for from the standpoint
of social justice, one may reasonably doubt that discrete classes merit judi-
cial intervention more than the economically disadvantaged. Futhermore,
persons falling within an economic classification are as precisely ascertain-
able at any given point in time as are women.
Frontiero, however, presents larger problems than either Dandridge
or Rodriguez since other equality interests which Congress may seek to
protect conflict with the equality interest asserted by women with non-
dependent husbands. Fundamental fairness requires, for example, that
people receive equal pay for equal work. Since women members of the
armed forces do not incur the same risks as men, one might cogently
argue that women should not be given financial benefits of the same mag-
nitude. But equally as important as a sex classification, single persons
have a demonstrable equality interest in being paid as much as married
persons for the same work. Arguably, the irrelevant fact of marital status
should not entitle married persons to additional allowances for the same
work. From the single person's standpoint, it is bad enough that depen-
dency allowances are granted at all, let alone to males with non-dependent
spouses, and the court further injures this equality interest when it extends
availability of such allowances to married women. No rule can be discov-
ered from the reasoning of the case to determine how the Court selects
from this spectrum of competing equality interests the one which must
prevail, nor is there any hint as to the relative weight such an interest
must bear in the legislative balancing process.
The pregnancy leave case presents the question whether any reason
exists for treating pregnancy differently from physical illness. While prob-
ing for evidence which would justify different treatment the courts tend
to emphasize statements by physicians to the effect that each pregnancy
is sui generis and that many pregnant women can work until delivery
without experiencing medical difficulties or decreased efficiency. But the
fact that many, or some, pregnant women would not have a detrimental
effect upon the interests of the state or school board 'has little direct rele-
81 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
8293 S.Ct. 1278 (1973).
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vance to the issue of whether many other pregnancies would injure those
interests. Furthermore, the inquiries into the ability of "many" pregnant
teachers to work up until delivery has no relevance to the issue of whether
medical differences exist between pregnancy and illness justifying a differ-
ence in treatment. The appropriate inquiry would be whether pregnancy
would in "many" cases result in inefficiency or suddenly occurring disrup-
tive medical complications if pregnant persons were allowed to work as
long as they wished. From the evidence, it appears that many pregnancies
result in decreased efficiency and sudden medical complications, and it
would seem that the state has power to prevent and eliminate these ills
within the ranks of its employees. Thus the precise questions become
whether other diseases give rise to the same disruptions and inefficiencies
as pregnancy and whether any distinction exists between these other dis-
eases and pregnancy that would justify different treatment. While diseases
and accidents can produce disruption of activities and impairment of effi-
ciency just like pregnancy, the distinguishing aspect of pregnancy is that
it results from a course of voluntary behavior which makes the impending
loss of efficiency predictable. In contrast, the presence of disease or the
occurrence of an accident is usually not known until incapacitating symp-
toms are present. Thus the state cannot force the victims of disease and
accident to take leave before the decreased efficiency and other disruptive
symptoms have already caused the damage which a pregnancy leave rule
is designed to prevent.
For purposes of analysis there remains a small but important class
of medical ailments such as cateracts or prostate troubles which, although
contracted involuntarily, nevertheless give prior warning of impending in-
efficiency and disruptive medical consequences. Evidence whether this pre-
cise class of diseases differs from pregnancy has relevance to the equal
protection claim, for it is only with respect to this limited class of diseases
that pregnant women receive different treatment. The pregnancy leave
cases have failed to focus on this precise question and only speculation
exists whether the ultimate inefficiency and disruption brought about by
a gradually debilitating disease is precisely predictable at some future date
and thus distinguishable from complications arising out of pregnancy
which develop unexpectedly throughout the term.84 It may well be that
few employees faced, for example, with blindness or cancer would choose
to remain on the job and undergo the catastrophic physical consequences
which would accompany inefficiency. In the cases of illness with long
term predictable effects, the state might well conclude that the drastic per-
sonal consequences of not taking leave make it probable that each affected
83 See e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 98a, 99a, 103a, 109a,-118a, La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
84id.
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employee will voluntarily go on leave before the state's efficiency interest
is threatened. In the case of pregnancy, many medical complications are
often temporary and are insufficient to insure that all pregnant employees
will take leave before inefficiency and disruption set in. This rational
distinction could, perhaps, be supported with medical evidence, but to date
none has been produced. Curiously though, the very fact that pregnancy
leave is mandatory may indicate that pregnant employees will not leave
voluntarily. Thus the classification created by the terms of the statute
may support the view that the personal consequences of pregnancy are
temporary and less drastic to the employee than those presented by long
term disease, although each presents a similar threat to the state interest
in efficient employees and minimization of disruption. 5 The pregnancy
leave rule is a rational tool for preventing pregnant persons from saddling
the state with the effects of their pregnancy,-effects which seldom threat-
en serious permanent harm to the pregnant individual. Unfortunately,
the cases do not focus on the issue and none cite evidence relevant to
it.
A lesson may be learned from this failure, for whenever a rule or
statute is attacked under the rationality test of the "newer" equal protec-
tion, the party defending the statute must stay close to he obvious purpose
suggested by its terms. The suggestion that a pregnancy leave rule, rather
obviously designed to force pregnant persons to take leaves they would
not otherwise take, is related to the health of the mother, or the prevention
of snide remarks, or having an identifiable date upon which to replace
her can only invite disaster. 6 Under the newer equal protection, attorneys
must decipher the real purpose of the statute directly from its terms and
then gather evidence to support the reasonableness of the classification cre-
ated. Casting around for all sorts of imaginary and marginal purposes
simply will not save a statute and will often serve to arouse judicial suspi-
cions of invidious purposes. In addition, it is often a simple matter to
demonstrate lack of rationality to such marginal purposes.
Analytical parallels to the pregnancy leave rule can be seen in statutes
which require public employees to retire at age sixty-five and in statutes
which forbid minors to marry, vote, work, or drive. In these statutes the
state applies a conclusive presumption of senility to those reaching sixty-
five and a conclusive presumption of immaturity to those under the age
of eighteen. For the sake of convenience, the state treats all members
of each class alike and does not hold senility or immaturity hearings for
85 This follows despite absences of recollection to this effect by actual draftsmen of these
rules. See testimony of Dr. Mark Shinnerer, Brief for Petitioner, at 166a-88a, La Fleur v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
86 The testimony of Dr. Shinnerer can only be disasterous in light of the judicial aversion




the individuals involved. If the pregnant employee has the right to be
treated as an individual, then arguably, the same right should be extended
to the aged and the adolescent. The fact that "many" persons could per-
form efficiently until age eighty-five probably will not deprive the state
of power to treat all sixty-five year olds equally, provided the state can
show that many do lose efficiency at this age. The same argument applies
to adolescents. A state is not required to accept the word of a twelve
year old or his physician that he is capable of driving, working, marrying,
or voting. The state will always have the power to stereotype twelve year
olds and treat each of them as if they conform to the adolescent norm.
An intuitive or normative weakness in the claim of aged or adolescent
persons to individual treatment stems from the fact that some stereotypes
are useful. Legislative assumptions that no one under eighteen will vote
intelligently, or that all persons above the age of sixty-five are inefficient,
or that all murderers deserve life sentences, or that job applicants with
college degrees will be the more competent employees, represent useful
codifications of experience. In each case, the severe injustice placed upon
individuals who do not fit the mold is tolerated for lack of more accurate
methods of ascertaining individual qualities.
But in one crucial respect, pregnancy leave differs from the equal pro-
tection claims of the aged and the adolescent. Many individuals above
the age of eighteen are immature and many under the age of sixty-five
are inefficient. The adolescent and the aged are thus treated unequally
with respect to conditions occurring in the unregulated class of middle
age. Under these facts, a clear equality injury is shown. But if this were
not the case, if senility and immaturity could never occur between the
ages of eighteen and sixty-five, then laws which stereotype by age could
not produce any equality injury or offend any equality interest. This dis-
tinction highlights the most significant aspect of the pregnancy leave case,
for if senility and immaturity never occurred in the middle ages, then
the adolescent and the aged could not show any equality injury arising
out of such statutes.
V. EQUALITY INJURIES AND THE
CONCEPT OF EQUAL PROTECTION
All legislation burdens some classes and confers benefits upon others.
Those who suffer statutory burdens have a minimum claim that the statute
bear a reasonable relation to a state purpose. "And the guarantee of due
process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.""7
With a substantive du6 process attack upon economic regulations pre-
8 7 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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cluded after 193788 plaintiffs resorted to the equal protection clause,89 and
a similar rational basis standard was developed in order to preclude attacks
upon regulatory statutes. "The constitutional safeguard of equal protection
is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the state's objective. . . .A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."90  Due to the improbability of successful attack under this
minimal rational relation equal protection standard,9 no theoretical distinc-
tion between the respective injuries necessary to support due process attacks
and equal protection attacks has formally developed in the case law.- Pre-
sumably, however, any injury will give rise to a due process claim, while
only equality injuries will support an equal protection claim.
The land mark equal protection cases upholding statutes under the
minimal rationality standard, give a rather uniform picture of the types
of equality interests which will produce an equal protection claim.92 In
each of these cases, the complaining party was treated unequally with re-
spect to a condition shared by an unregulated class which received a dis-
tinct competitive advantage. Characteristically, the equality injury could
be remedied by broadening the classification to include others similarly
situated with respect to the states interest. Although it would be more
valuable to the plaintiffs if the judiciary would preclude state regulation
in the field as a matter of substantive due process, it is nevertheless in
the plaintiffs' interests to remove from the statute books classifications
which confer advantages upon competitors.
88 McCloskey, Economic Due Process and, the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial,
1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34, 38.
89 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336
U.S. 220 (1949); Goessart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
9 0 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
9 1 Morey v. Doud has been the only equal protection attack to succeed.
92 In Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), the statute under
attack permitted advertising on the side of trucks relating to the business of the owner, but
prohibited such advertising for hire. The under inclusiveness of the classification with respect
to the state interest in eliminating distractions gave companies owning their own trucks an
advantage over carriers for hire who rented space on the side of their vehicles. The statute
attacked in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), prohibited fitting glasses except
upon prescription of a licensed optometrist or physician, but exempted sale of ready to wear
glasses if selection was at the discretion of the purchaser. The under inclusiveness created
by the exemption gave ready to wear producers a competitive advantage over opticians similarly
situated with respect to the evils of unprescribed eyewear. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957), an Illinois statute placed a myriad of restrictions upon sellers of money orders
but exempted American Express by name. The under inclusive classification, created because
of American Express' financial stability, gave the company an accute advantage over its competitors
in the money order business. McGowen v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 420 (1961), involved a
Maryland statute forbidding Sunday sales but exempting a long list of items and activities.
The under inclusive classification put the convicted retailer at a distinct competitive disadvantage
to others similarly situated but exempted, as part of an effort to curb the evils of Sunday
sales.
NOTES
If, in the case of the restrictions imposed upon adolescents and the
aged, immaturity and inefficiency were absolutely unknown among the
middle-aged, then it would be impossible for the legislature to remedy
inequality by broadening the classifications created, that is, to broaden the
pertinent statute to include the middle-aged. Although the middle-aged
would enjoy an advantage over the young and the old, this advantage
would not be one unequally granted by the statute, and an equal protection
remedy would be powerless to remove the advantage. Irrespective of
whether the laws impose burdens on all immature and inefficient persons
as individuals or presume an equal distribution of the undesirable qualities
throughout the respective classes, the classes still bear their burdens with-
out the aid of any equal protection claim with respect to the classification
of middle age.
The only equality injury of which the adolescent or aged could com-
plain would be the over inclusiveness of the classification. Mature adoles-
cents and competent aged persons are treated the same as the immature
and senile within their respective age groups. However, the over inclusive
classification does not produce any equality injury between the regulated
and unregulated classes as a whole. Although, for example, mature ado-
lescents might wish to be treated equally with adults, nevertheless, the
statutory classification depends upon the probability of immaturity among
all individuals comprising the class, and thus the mature adolescent could
not show any equality injury between the classification into which he has
been put and the unregulated class of adults. The mature adolescent could
claim that the classification of adults should be broadened to include him,
but this argument for narrowing the regulated class would necessarily rely
on the equality interests of sub-sets of persons within the statutory classifi-
cation as a whole. Thus under our assumption that immaturity and inef-
ficiency never occur within the unregulated classes, no equality interest
exists which will justify broadening the classification nor can any be found
to justify narrowing it.
The overbreadth situation presents policy considerations which militate
against judicial cognizance of an equal protection claim. An overbroad
classification is all that can be required of the legislature in terms of expos-
ing itself to political retribution. Any judicial attempt to narrow the classi-
fication could not make it more just from a legislative perspective.93 Since
93 The concurrence of Justice Jackson in Railway Express v..New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1944), supports this point.
The burden should rest heavily upon one who would persuade us to use the Due
Process Clause to strike down a substantive law or ordinance. Even its provident use
against municipal regulations frequently disables all government-state, municipal and
federal-from dealing with the conduct in question because the requirement of Due
Process is also applicable to State and Federal Governments. Invalidation of a statute
or an ordinance on Due Process grounds leaves ungoverned or ungovernable conduct
which many people find objectionable.
Invocation of the Equal Protection Clause, on the other hand, does not disable the
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a legislature always incurs more than the required minimum of electoral
disfavor when it classifies overbroadly, one must presume that no practical
alternative classification existed or that the legislature sought to achieve
some overriding equality value within the regulated class. It is not hard
to imagine that the state interest in treating all sixteen year olds equally
with respect to voting, drinking, driving, working and marrying more than
justifies the unfairness to atypical individuals. This same state interest
behind the overinclusive pregnancy leave rule was suggested in rather un-
chivalrous terms by the Schattman court when it suggested that a flexible
rule would cause jealousy and recrimination."
In the pregnancy leave rule situation, the court cannot broaden the
classification since it already applies to all pregnancies. There is no com-
petitive advantage which judicial broadening could possibly take away. The
argument that each pregnancy must be treated on an individual basis
amounts to a claim that the classification must be narrowed to the point
where it ceases to exist. This amounts to an effective substitute for sub-
stantive due process; the requested relief prevents the state from classifying
at all with respect to a condition which threatens state interests.
Non-pregnant employees do not receive any competitive advantage
from the operation of a pregnancy leave rule. Their pay does not increase,
their initial employment prospects are not improved, nor do they gain
seniority for promotion purposes. If the pregnancy leave rule is struck
down, the competitive interests of non-pregnant teachers do not change
in the slightest degree. They lose no advantage because none was con-
ferred, and they could care less whether the rule survives. In sharp con-
trast, the demise of the sex classification in Goesaert v. Cleary would have
placed the male bartender's union in a far worse position. Justifiably,
they would have lost a statutory monopoly advantage, with a lower wage
rate and possible unemployment at the margin. Similarly, in Reed, the
males lost their guaranteed competitive edge over women when the classi-
fication according to sex was held unconstitutional. Thus, the claim to
individual treatment in the pregnancy leave case should not be confused
governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the
prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine
that cities, states, and the Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not
to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice.
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is
no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government
than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so
effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will
apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure
that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
Id. at 112-13.
94 459 F.2d 32, 39 (5th Cir. 1972).
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with the genuine equal protection claims of women to have their skills
evaluated on an individual basis when competing with males.
In order to present an equal protection claim, reliance must be placed
upon the equality interests of the classification created. One simply cannot
rely upon the equality interests of the class in order to narrow its applica-
bility. If it could be shown that an overinclusive statute was legislatively
invidious, then a member of the class ought to be able to rely upon a
due process right to escape from invidious burdens. But invidiousness
alone ought not trigger an equal protection claim unless the class can
demonstrate an equality injury. 5  It would be somewhat illogical for
courts to recognize equal protection claims of individuals within an over-
broad classification to be treated like members of an unregulated class
which never experiences the regulated condition. 6 In the pregnancy leave
case there can be no rational method of narrowing the classification since
the risk of sudden medical complications is spread uniformly throughout
the class. Not only does the pregnant employee fail to demonstrate any
method of subdividing the class with respect to the predictable risk of sud-
den medical complications arising out of her condition, but she cannot
show any equality injury since non-pregnant persons never share these
risks.
On the other hand, there is a line of cases which take cognizance
of the equal protection claims of underinclusive classifications where
neither class gains any advantage over the other. This unique equality
interest was recognized in the cases which ordered "separate but equal"
golf courses and swimming pools integrated. 7  Although whites realize
no competitive advantage from the separate facilities, the Court found that
isolation by race stygmatized the black race and branded them as second
class citizens. This psychic injury was sufficient to sustain an equal protec-
9 5 As a matter of fact, most racial classifications are underinclusive and over inclusive at
the same time with respect to the same state interest. For example, a statute denying the
vote to blacks is under inclusive with respect to the interest in assuring qualified electors
since many whites are not qualified. It is over inclusive with respect to the same interest
since many blacks are qualified. Thus the strongest inference of legislature invidiousness
arises whenever any classification is both under inclusive and over inclusive. An intelligent
argument can be made that any classification which is over inclusive and under inclusive with
respect to the legislative purpose should be treated as suspect irrespective of the race of the
class affected or the geographic region of origin of the statute. It follows that suspect status
should not be granted to discrete classes for all purposes of equal protection review. This
particular analytical mode would provide a neutral principle for expanding the applicability
of the doctrine and would free it from the shackles of judicial ideology.
96 While discussing the problem of overinclusiveness in Tussman and TenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 351-52 (1949), the authors note that the
courts have preferred to deal with over inclusiveness in due process terms but argue that
equal protection should cover the 'situation. To the contrary, in those admittedly rare cases
of pure overinclusion, the classification is premised upon the uniform distribution of a particular
risk to state interests within the class. There is no rational way in whch to narrow that
classification since all members are subject to the same risk.
97 Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
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tion claim to a broadening of the racial classifications contained in the
separate but equal ordinances. If, however, whites were inherently inca-
pable of playing golf, it would be hard to argue that state maintenance
of a golf course (or the failure to maintain one) would stygmatize blacks.
It is only when races are treated separately with respect to the same condi-
tions that the psychic injury may arise. For example, if all blacks were
required to take a test for sickle cell anemia, an equal protection attack
upon the statute should fail. The statute would be overinclusive with
respect to its purpose of detecting sickle cell anemia since many of the
individuals within the regulated class do not posses the trait. But the
class as a whole could not show any equality injury. Only the irrational
or hypersensitive could argue that such a law would stygmatize the class.
Broadening the classification to make all persons undergo such tests would
be irrational, since the condition never occurs among whites. Thus any
complaint against the statute would have nothing to do with the equality
interests of the classification created, and members of the class could only
argue that the regulation deprived them of due process of law. If the
sickle cell anemia law were passed with malevolent intent to burden
blacks, then it should be struck down on due process grounds, but the
classification would not necessarily share ,this invidiousness. In this case
the legislative purpose would. be invidious and a claim for relief should
not depend upon equality interests offended. In contrast, if the legislature
invidiously created an underinclusive classification with respect to a permis-
sible state purpose, then an equal protection claim arises, however, the
hypothetical sickle cell anemia statute would give rise to no such claim.
In order to statisfy the skeptic, return to Lochner and assume that
the same case were to arise today under the "newer equal protection."
Lochner struck down a statute restricting hours of bakers as violative of
substantive due process. 8 But if the same facts were to arise after the
pregnancy leave case, the original result could be achieved without resort
to substantive due process. Very simply, Lochner could argue that the
purpose of the statute was to protect the health of workers, and that the
long hours of butchers and candlestick makers also threatened the state
interest in a healthy labor force. Singling out bakers for hour limitations
shockingly and invidiously denies them equal protection of the laws. At
trial Lochner could stage an impressive array of doctors to testify that
the health of bakery employees varied widely depending upon conditions
in the particular shop. Perhaps the expert for the state would concede
that each bake shop was sui generis and should be treated as such if pos-
sible. Lochner could insist that he be treated as an individual and that
the word of his physician on the health of his employees must be accepted
9 8 Lochner was overruled in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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as long as butchers' and candlestick-makers' maximum hours were not reg-
ulated.
Under this latter day Lochner hypothetical, the Court need never in-
quire into the rationality, invidiousness, or "suspectness" of the classifica-
tion, because Lochner has presented no equal protection claim at all.
Broadening the classification to include butchers and candlestick makers
will not remove any statutory competitive advantage, nor will it benefit
Lochner in any way. Actually, he wants to be free of such restrictions
himself. He seeks to escape the burdens imposed upon an over-inclusive
class and thus he forsakes any reliance upon the equality interests of the
class as a whole.
Thus stripped of his equal protection claim, this latter day Lochner
is relegated to the status of a substantive due process claimant where he
loses on the basis of stare decisis. Yet Lochner's equal protection claim
is certainly no weaker than that of the pregnant public employee. It does
her absolutely no good to broaden the classification to force males to take
paternity leaves nor do these plaintiffs want mandatory leaves for illnesses.
Rather, as an individual, each plaintiff seeks to escape the burdens imposed
upon an overinclusive class. Any equality interest of the class from which
they seek escape is thus irrelevant to their claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the pregnancy leave rule deals precisely and narrowly with
an avoidable condition it does not classify by sex. If sex classifications
are suspect, the resulting stringent standard of review cannot rationally
be applied to a pregnancy leave rule. But even if pregnancy leave rules
do constitute sex discrimination, granting suspect classification status to
women cannot be justified. First, a discrete majority of the population
may always protect itself through the legislative process if if is genuinely
repressed. Thus women do not need judicial protection. Second, under
the limitations inherent in the concept of judicial review, legislative solici-
atude for women's equality interests precludes, rather than mandates, judi-
cial intervention. Finally, as a historical matter, the female legislative
stereotype reinforced the values of the majority of women, and there is
no evidence that a majority ever objected to the stereotype. For these rea-
sons, sex classifications are completely inapposite to race, alienage, and
national origin. Although pregnancy leave rules do not classify by sex
and although women do not merit suspect classifications treatment, the
Court may nevertheless strike the rule down if it fails to meet the more
stringent rationality requirement of the newer equal protection. The dif-
ference in treatment between pregnancy and illness will satisfy that test
if it can be shown that victims of diseases with long term predictable
effects will voluntarily take leaves before any impairment of efficiency or
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disruptive conditions set in and if it can be shown that many women will
not take leave voluntarily before inefficiency and disruptive complications
occur. In all probability, however, the Court will be able to strike down
the statute by ignoring purposes, framing the purpose as a unitary value,
and by manipulating the level of abstraction irrespective of whether this
showing of rationality is made 9
The most novel and singular aspect of the pregnancy leave case arises
out of the fundamental inconsistency between the asserted equality intereft
and the relief requested. Non-pregnant employees receive no competitive
advantage from the rule and thus no inequality exists which can be cured
by broadening the classification to force paternity leaves or to force sick
leaves. Since women alone become pregnant, there can be no badge of
opprobrium which would justify per se invalidity of classifications by preg-
nancy. Finally, since pregnant employees claim the right to have their
pregnancies treated on an individual basis, they are in fact seeking relief
from a classification which is over-inclusive with respect to the state interest
protected. An individual claim to escape the classification created cannot
draw support from any equality interest possessed by that class.
If the court takes cognizance of an equal protection claim in the preg-
nancy leave case, it will provide an equal protection claim whenever a
statute imposes burdens or benefits. Under the old minimal rationality
standard, this extension of equal protection sub-strata would have made
little difference, but with the advent of the "newer equal protection" and
the higher rationality requirement, the results under the old substantive
due process cases will be attainable under the rubric of equal protection.
Although this result may have ideological appeal, it is theoretically unto-
ward. Thus, in the pregnancy leave case, the ultimate question whether
burdens imposed by pregnancy leave rules are reasonable in light of the
alleged threat to state interests should be resolved by balancing under due
process rather than equal protection.
John D. Gardner
99 See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123,
132-38 (1973).
